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NATIONAL STRUCTURE OF DONBAS IN THE FOCUS 
OF THE HYBRID WAR IN UKRAINE 
The undeclared war, that has been raging for the second year in Ukraine, now, long 
before its end, again and again forces us to go back to its roots. There is a rather 
popular point of view about conscious Ukrainian people, who made their choice 
in favor of Europe, and about an “irresponsible” and subsidized Donbas, who did 
not take this idea properly. It appears with an enviable persistence in some media 
and statements of some politicians, and can hardly be taken as well-grounded. In 
this article we do not intend to refute these or similar maxims. Perhaps, there is no 
need to do it as they don’t answer the main question: why? Why did Donbas, with 
its enormous intellectual and economic potential, fall a victim of the cunning plans 
of our yesterday’s “strategic partners”. They could hardly be implemented but for 
the internal reasons, which have become a convenient excuse to transform the in-
dustrial Donbas in an arena of combat.
So what were the reasons of the war? We think that it was a complex of in-
tertwined economic, political, mental, national and even domestic reasons. Each 
of them should be studied separately by political scientists, demographers, soci-
ologists, and representatives of many other sciences. In the range of this discourse 
it is interesting to analyze the situation from the point of view of the aggressor’s 
choosing the areas to implement the plans. Therefore, the purpose of this article 
is to identify the factors, which predisposed to both aggression and quasi-public 
experiments in the national structure of Donbas. For its implementation I will 
analyze the dynamics of the quantitative growth of ethnic Russians for a quite 
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long chronological period, as well as examine the level of use of the Russian 
language by the local population. From our point of view, the national composi-
tion of the population and predominant use of the Russian language were those 
factors that determined the further destiny of this region. First of all, they gave 
the pretext for the Russian Federation to transform Donbas into a fi ring ground 
of Ukraine’s destruction.
This region has traditionally played a leading role in the economic life of the 
Russian Empire and later in the USSR. Practically since its inception the region has 
turned into a centre of economic development, this fact caused its colonization by 
people of different nationalities and, fi rst of all, by the Russians. At the same time 
a considerable part of peoples known in the Russian Empire as “non-Russians”, 
used the Russian language as the means of interethnic communication. The new 
empire with its slogans about proletarian internationalism and all kinds of “jumps” 
into a “bright future” increased the importance of Donbas, turning it into an “all-
Union stokehold”. 
Independent Ukraine got Donbas with a well-developed but outmoded in-
dustrial infrastructure, a bouquet of social and environmental problems, and an ex-
tremely varied national composition of the population. Therefore, from the point of 
view of thorny economic, social, ecological, and even linguistic problems, let alone 
Donbas’ importance in the structure of Ukrainian economy, the region requires 
a special treatment and, moreover, a carefully considered policy.
It is no accident, that among a great number of aspects of this problem, we 
have emphasized the issue of formation of the national structure in the region. 
This issue is closely related with a lot of questions, such as the establishment of 
the Ukrainian language in the region, the nature of the formation of inter-ethnic 
relations, fostering a sense of patriotism among the younger generation, and many 
others.
 In the most general statement of the question we study the peculiarities of 
formation and consolidation of the Ukrainian nation in the post-Soviet time. Espe-
cially as because from time to time some politicians artifi cially forced some tension 
around the Russian component in the national structure of Donbas. Fortunately, in 
a peaceful everyday life the vast majority of people, belonging to various nationali-
ties of Donbas, didn’t feel any discrimination.
Historiography of the problem is represented by a wide spectrum of scien-
tifi c fi ndings. We will dare to stop on their short characteristic as they express meth-
odological approaches to the treatment of national problems in modern Ukraine. 
The works by L.P. Nagornaya have a conceptual signifi cance for consideration of 
the given problem, as they are devoted to the problems of socio-cultural and re-
gional identity.1 The fundamental research by V.O. Romantsov submits the analysis 
1 Л.П. Нагорна, Регіональна ідентичність: український контекст, ІПіЕНД імені 
І.Ф. Кураса НАН України, Київ 2008, pp. 405.
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of dynamics of growth of the population in Ukraine and its language over a long 
historical period.2
However, it should be noted, that a number of studies are characterized by 
pronounced political overtones. This approach, in particular, is seen in the works 
by Giroaki Couromia “Freedom and Terror in Donbas. “Ukrainian-Russian bor-
derlands, 1870–1990-ies”, which, though being one of the most cited studies in the 
fi eld of national issues of Donbass, can be applied to it only politically. In this work, 
we think, some issues lack proper underlying reasoning. But the publication is full 
of unsubstantiated conclusions. For example, the author did not even think it neces-
sary to explain his rather dubious maxim about the aggravation of anti-Semitism in 
the society at the period of its industrial development.3
Unfortunately, some studies are characterized by a politically biased rheto-
ric, accompanied by overt hostility to one of the largest minorities living in the 
republic rather than giving a thorough analysis of the national problems in Ukraine.
Thus, the foreign researcher of Ukrainian lineage V. Kubiewicz connects 
the numerical increase of the Russians on the territory of present Ukrainian lands 
solely with the domination of the Bolshevik regime.4 
The economic and social attractiveness of Ukrainian lands at the stage of the 
rapid economic development is not taken into account; that is, the objective com-
ponent of the national formation of the region is totally excluded from the analysis.
In this regard, in contrast to the above, the arguments of the modern Ukrain-
ian researcher Y.O. Nikolayets seem more solid. In the introduction to his work, 
he is absolutely right when focuses on the complexity and ambiguity of the ethnic 
structure formation of the region, where “the interests of many public entities, and 
the interests of certain social and ethnic groups, brought about primarily by the 
economic and social problems” are closely intertwined.5 
The study by N.G. Malyarchuk “The Russians in Donbas (the 1920s–1930s)” 
gives, in our view, an objective retrospective of the settlement process in Donbas. 
The author explicitly connects the relocation of the Russians and their subsequent 
quantitative predominance in the region (compared with other ethnic minorities) 
with the beginning of the industrial settlement process.6 
2 В.О. Романцов, Населення України і його рідна мова за часів радянсь кої влади та 
незалежності (XX – початок XXI століття), Вид-во імені Олени Теліги, Київ 2008, pp. 184.
3 Куромия Гироаки, Свобода и терор в Донбассе. Украинско-российское пограничье 
в 1870–1990-е годы. (Пер. с англ. Г. Херян, В. Агеев; Предесл. Г.Немыри), Изд-во Соломии 
Павлычко «Основа», Київ 2002, p. 477.
4 В. Кубієвич, Національний склад населения Совєцької України у світлі совєцьких 
переписів с 17.12.1926 по 1959 г. Відбиток зі збірника присвяченого пам’яті З. Кузелі, Запи-
ски НТШ”, т. LХІХ, Париж 1962, p. 16.
5 Ю.А. Николаец, Поселенська структура населення Донбасу (етнополітичний 
аспект динамики). Монографія, ІПЕНД імені І.Ф.Кураса НАН України, Київ 2012, p. 5.
6 М.Г. Малярчук, Росіяни в Донбасі (20–30 рр. ХХ века). Монографія, П.П.Чернец-
кий, Донецьк 2011, p. 41.
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The study of the Lviv historian I.Y. Terlyuk devoted to the same problem, 
though in a somewhat different dimension, chronological and territorial boundaries 
(West Ukrainian lands) is of specifi c interest too. Paying tribute to the thorough-
ness of the analysis, conducted by the author and illustrated by a large number of 
statistical material, we admit lack of objectiveness when treating the issue. This 
applies equally to the explanation of the reasons for the quantitative growth of 
the Russians in the western Ukrainian region and the increase in the number of 
Russian-speaking population by reducing Ukrainian-speaking one.7
In our opinion, besides the subjective factor, to which it is possible to attrib-
ute the national policy of the totalitarian state, and which is reasonably emphasized 
by the author, there was an objective factor as well, a civilizing one, which was 
typical not only for the Soviet space, but was inherent in other, non-socialist coun-
tries of the world.
Apart from the subjective factor, which includes the national policy of the 
totalitarian state, which is not without reason emphasized by the author, there acted 
an objective factor, civilizational, characteristic not only of the Soviet period, but 
also of other, non-socialist countries in the world. Therefore, reducing the problem 
only to the peculiarities of the national policy of totalitarianism is the simplest 
explanation, which can be found in the study. The simplest and, in our opinion, 
the least convincing. This approach does not reveal the essence of the national pro-
cesses. It focuses researchers on the study of the external, most accessible, visible 
markers. Excluding the objective side of the process only complicates the scientifi c 
solution of the problem.
Thus, a preliminary analysis of the scientifi c literature suggests quite a broad 
historiography of the problem, but at the same time it demonstrates lack of defi nite 
scientifi c views as to its resolution. The latest gives us the reason for tracing the dy-
namics of the process of Russian settlement of the territory of Donbas from 1959 to 
2001. It is the quantitative aspect of the issue and its dynamics which can underlie 
the resolution of many other problems related to the study of the language, culture 
and education, which are the subject of many research studies.
We hope that the results will be of interest not only to the representatives of 
various sciences, but will also help to take effective measures for the development 
of education and language policy in this important region of Ukraine. The main 
source base of our study are the results of the All-Union censuses of 1959, 1970, 
1979 and 1989 and the fi rst All-Ukrainian census of 2001.
On the basis on these sources we have compiled the table given below. It 
allows tracing the dynamics of the Russian people settlement of the Donetsk and 
Lugansk regions in the framework of the other, most numerous nationalities of 
Donbas.8 
7 І. Терлюк, Росіяни західних областей України (1944–1996 гг.) (Етносоцологічне 
дослідження, Центр Європи, Львів 1997, pp. 176.
8 The table is compiled on the basis: Итоги Всесоюзной переписи населения 1959 года. 
Украинская ССР, Госполитиздат, Москва 1963, pp. 210; Итоги Всесоюзной переписи населе-
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Table 1. Dynamics of the National Population Structure of Donbas 
(Absolute data [million people] and %)
Prefecture 
and the national
structure 
of the population
Census
1959
Census
1970
Census
1979
Census
1989
Census
2001
Donetsk: 
total population: 
including: 
Ukrainians
Russians
Greeks
Belarusians
Tatars
4262,0
2368,1/55,6
1601,2/37,6
93,2/2,2
63,3/1,5
24,5/0,57 
4891,9
2596,8/53,0
1987,2/40,6
93,9/1,9
77,8/1,6
26,7/0,54 
5160,6
2622,5/50,8
2225,3/43,1
90,5/1,7
75,8/1,5
26,0/0,50 
5311
2693,4/50,7
2316,0/43,6
83,6/1,6
76,9/1,4
25,5/048 
4825,5
2744/56,9
1844,4/38,2
77,5/1,6
44,5/0,9
19,2/0,4 
Lugansk: 
total population: 
including: 
Ukrainians 
Russians 
Greeks 
Belarusians
Tatars
2542,2
1416,3/57,7
950,0/38,7
25,8/1,0
12,6/0,51 
2750,5
1506,5/54,8
1148,3/41,7
36,1/1,3
12,8/0,5 
2786,7
1472,7/51,2
1222,0/43,8
33,5/1,2
12,4/0,4 
2857,0
1482,2/51,9
1279,0/44,8
33,5/1,2
11,0/04 
2540,2
1472,3/58,0
991,8/39,0
20,6/0,8
The table demonstrates a steady population growth in the two Donbas re-
gions up to 2001 inclusive. At the same time we cannot but note a gradual slow-
down. If we continue to calculate the table, we will monitor the highest rates of 
population growth in 1970 Census. Compared with the previous census in 1959 
the number of inhabitants of Donetsk region increased by 629.9 thousand people or 
14.8%. Lugansk region didn’t show such rates. Here the number of residents grew 
by 208.3 thousand or by 8.2 %.
Among the total population the number of inhabitants of the indigenous na-
tionality in Donetsk region increased by 228.7 thousand (9.6%), and in Lugansk – 
90.2 thousand (6.3%). The share of the Ukrainians in 1970 was 53.0 % and 54.8 %, 
respectively. We will treat the last exponent with more precision as its comparison 
with the similar data for 1959 shows a decrease in the share of the Ukrainian popu-
lation in the country. Reducing of the proportion of the Ukrainians for this period 
amounted in Donetsk region – 2.6 %, and in Lugansk – 2.9 %. The overall Donbas 
proportion of the Ukrainians decreased by 1.1 %. Thus, 1970 is the year when the 
ния 1970 года. Миграция населения. Число и состав семей в СССР/ ЦСУ СССР, Статистика 
Москва 1974, pp. 455; Итоги Всесоюзной переписи населения 1979 года, т. ІV: Националь-
ный состав населения СССР, часть 2: Распределение населения отдельных национальностей 
СССР по полу, возрасту, языку, состояния в браке и уровню образования; Национальный со-
став населения СССР. По данным Всесоюзной переписи населения 1989 г., Статистика, Мо-
сква 1991, pp. 158; Итоги Всеукраинской переписи населения 2001 г., http://2001.ukrcensus.
gov.ua.
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census recorded a quantitative growth of the Ukrainians in the total population 
and, at the same time, reducing their share. During this decade, there was also an 
increase in the number of national minorities. In Donetsk region the number of rep-
resentatives of the Greek nationality increased by 0.7 million people (0.7%). How-
ever their share decreased from 2.2% to 1.9%. We can see an analogous situation 
with the number of the Tatar population. In quantitative terms we note an increase 
of 2.2 million people (8.9%). Their share decreased from 0.57 % to 0.54%. The 
Belarusian minority increased by 14.5 thousand (22.9%), but its share in the total 
population did not decrease, as in the Greek and Tatar minorities but increased by 
one percent – from 1.5% to 1.6%.
During this period in Lugansk region the Belarusian and Tatar minorities 
also increased: 10.3 million (39.9%) and 0.2 million (1.6%), respectively. The 
share of the Belarusians in the total population increased by 3%, and the Tatars, on 
the contrary, decreased by one-hundredth. However, the latter can not be taken into 
account, as this value is within the allowable error.
 So, the majority of the national minorities, who lived in Donbas, demon-
strate positive dynamics in terms of quantitative growth and in terms of their share 
in the total population. Slight deviations in the direction of decreasing can hardly be 
the evidence of the emergence of a threat to each of these minorities.
The Russian minority, according to the quantitative side of the issue and its 
growth rate was less than the indigenous nation just in its share in the total popu-
lation. During the time which elapsed from the fi rst post-war census the growth 
rate of the Russians exceeds that of the quantitative growth of the Ukrainians. In 
Donbas the Ukrainian population increased quantitatively from 3784.4 to 4103.3 
thousand people, that is by 7.8% (9.6% in Donetsk region and 6.4% in Lugansk 
region), the number of the Russians for this time there grew by 22.9 % (24.1 % in 
Donetsk and 20.8% in Lugansk regions).
Despite the quantitative growth of the Ukrainian population, its share de-
creased in Donetsk region from 55.6 % to 53.0 % (2.6%) and from 57.7 % to 54.8 
% (2.9 %) in Lugansk region. In general, in Donbas the share of the Ukrainians in 
the total population decreased from 55.6 % to 54.5 %, that is by 1.1%. Obvious-
ly, such difference in the growth rates of the Ukrainians (7.8%) and the Russians 
(18.6%) in Donbas could hardly bring other results. 
The excess of the Russian population growth over the Ukrainian more than 
twice does not require any comment, but needs clarifi cation of its reasons. First of 
all, pay attention to the corresponding fi gures about Ukraine, which, in our opinion, 
emphasize the peculiarities of formation of the national structure in Donbas in its 
Russian component.9
9 Переписи населения Украинской ССР 1959, 1970, 1979, 1989 рр.; Перший Всеукра-
їнський перепис населення 2001 р., http:likbez.org.ua.
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Тable 2. Changes in the Main National Structure of Ukraine
Prefecture 
and the national
structure 
of the
population
Census
1959 
Census
1970 
Census
1979 
Census
1989 
Census
2001 
absolute data (million people) and %
Ukraine:
total population:
including:
Ukrainians
Russians
others 
51, 452
37, 4 1/72,7
11.,35/22,0
2,67/5,2
48, 240
35,28/74,9
9,126/19,4
2.,71/5,7
49, 609
36,48/73,6
10, 47/21,1
2,64/5,3
51, 452
37,4/72,7
11,35/22,1
2,67/5,2
48, 240
37,5/77,8
8,43/17,3
2,36/4,9
The table shows that as opposed to Donbas, where the rate of increase in 
the number of persons of the indigenous nationality dropped, in the all-Ukrainian 
scale the fi gures remained within the limits of fl uctuations, which do not cause 
any alarm. In the same condition was the Russian minority in Donetsk and Lu-
hansk regions. Essentially, the reduction of the share of Ukrainian citizens of the 
Russian nationality took place only in the years of independence and amounted 
to 4.8%, which in absolute data compared to the previous census was just over 
2.9 million people.
Returning to the issue of the preferential growth of the Russians in the na-
tional structure of Donbas, it should be noted, that it is not as simple as it may seem 
at fi rst glance. One can, of course, boil it down to the infamous Russifi cation un-
derlying the national policy of the totalitarian state, where there is no dividing line 
between the objective and subjective components of the problem. However, imput-
ing all the “sins” of the national policy solely to the totalitarianism is unlikely to 
bring us closer to the truth. Publication volume does not allow us to fully disclose 
the reasons for this phenomenon.
So, out of the whole list of possibilities we select only the aspect of migra-
tion directed from the Soviet republics to Ukraine in general and to Donbas in 
particular. That is why from a long list of problems we highlight only the aspect of 
migration, directed from the Union republics to Donbas. As the basis for the calcu-
lation were used the materials of the population census of 1970.
The census enlisted among the migrants those who lived in the area less than 
two years. Thus, for two years by 1970 52844 persons migrated to Donetsk region 
from other republics, and 76445 – to the territory of Lugansk. All of them came 
from the Russian Federation, the Byelorussian SSR, the Kazakh SSR and other 
Soviet republics. Totally 129 285 people came over the suggested period. At a fi rst 
glance, the fi gure is not impressive, as it makes only 1.72 % of the total population 
of the region. But on closer examination the impression changes.
If we consider that more than 10 years passed since the previous census, and 
take into account the biennial census of qualifi cation, the number of arrivals from 
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the above listed republics could be increased in 5 times. In this case the number of 
people, who had come for permanent residence to Donbas by 1970, did not make 
up 129 thousand people but about 650 thousand people, it made 8.6% of its total 
population. At the same time, an increase in the number of persons of Ukrainian 
nationality during the same period amounted to 319 thousand people.
Certainly, there was a reverse fl ow, but it is unlikely it was greater than the 
one going to Donbas and Ukraine in general. Furthermore, it is obvious that this po-
tential outfl ow was more than offset by childbirths in Russian families who arrived 
from the RSFSR and other Soviet republics. These fi ndings are of fundamental 
importance for our study, as they indicate the scale of migration to Donbas.
If we continue to calculate the increase of the number of the Ukrainian and 
Russian population in Donbas using the above table, we will get the following re-
sults: numerical increase of the Ukrainians in the 1970 census, compared to 1959, 
was 7.8%. In 1979, compared to 1970, was 0.2%, in 1989, compared to 1979, 
1.9%. At the same time, the growth in the number of people, who considered them-
selves to be ethnic Russians, amounted to 18.6%, 9.0%, 4.3%, respectively. Thus, 
the average increase in the number of the Ukrainians for the entire period was 
3.3%, and the Russians – 10.6%.
These calculations require rethinking of some stereotypes. First of all, obvi-
ously, the linguistic meaning of the notion “russifi cation” should be clarifi ed. As 
a rule, this notion refers to the Soviet period of Ukrainian history, and it means 
a forced imposition of the Russian language often for account of the national lan-
guage’s supplanting. We do not fundamentally object to this interpretation, but still 
consider it incomplete, because it includes only the exogenous part of the problem, 
brought by the power. But there is the other half of the problem – the endogenous 
one, originating directly from an individual. This part takes into account the im-
pact of both external and internal motives. Therefore, the endogenous factor seems 
more signifi cant. In the given case this may relate to the language. Being under the 
infl uence of certain motives, a citizen can choose the language suitable for him. 
Can this choice be made to the prejudice of the national identity? It bids fair, since 
a language is a part of it.
The objective side of the issue requires clarifi cation of the complex of rea-
sons for such a high level of migration to Ukraine by the Russians and other 
nationalities for whom the Russian language became a means of international 
communication. Obviously, fi rst it is necessary to examine the economic poten-
tial of the regions from which they moved to Donbas. The very list of Donbas 
“donor areas”, which is given in the census, can lead us to the assumption that the 
Russians and Russian-speaking people came here from other republics in search 
of jobs, decent wages and more or less tolerable food supply, that is, the benefi ts 
they lacked in their home areas. Probably we should recall that Donbas entered 
into the category of food supply, which was nearly the same as for the capital 
cities. Our conclusion could be proven by the fact that, for example, a sharp de-
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terioration in the economic situation in the 1990s led to a signifi cant outfl ow of 
the Russians.
Thus, during the entire postwar period the migration of the Russians and 
Russian-speaking population to Donbas could be easily observed. This tendency 
could not remain unnoticed by the Ukrainian authorities, and therefore it had to 
be in the sphere of their attention. The authorities couldn’t fail to become alerted 
because of a rather high percentage of the Russians in Donetsk and Lugansk re-
gions, they made 38.2% and 39.0%, respectively. Having added to these fi gures the 
predominant use of the Russian language in the regions, the situation became even 
more alarming. But in the 1950s–1990s the Ukrainian authorities, being under the 
pressure of the Party’s postulate on the convergence of nations and peoples in the 
period of Communism building, did not consider that tendency to be a threat to the 
society.
For the community known as the “Soviet people”, which was actively pro-
moted by the Party, indeed, there was no threat, but for the Ukrainian nation it 
was rather real. However, in 2001 the fi rst all-Ukrainian population census showed 
enough optimistic data. 67.5% of the population considered the Ukrainian language 
to be native. Taking into account the multinational character of the state, the result 
of the census was rather good. But in Donetsk and Lugansk regions the situation 
was critical. In these regions the Ukrainian language was admitted as a native one 
by 24.1% and 30.0% of citizens, respectively. 
The situation was even more threatening in the prism of infl uence of the na-
tional minority’s language, albeit the most numerous one, on the citizens of Ukrain-
ian nationality. The extent of this infl uence can’t but surprise. It is proved by the 
following table.10
Таble 3. The Russian Language in the Choice of the Native Language 
by the Ukrainians in Donbas 
Distribution 
of the population 
according to the place 
of residence
Total 
population 
(absolute 
data and %)
Including 
the Ukrainians
(absolute 
data and %) 
Including those, 
who recognized the 
Ukrainian language 
as native (absolute 
data and %)
Including those, 
who recognized 
the Russian language 
as native (absolute 
data and %)
Donetsk region
city /town 4363,6/90,1 2391,5/54,8 852,6/35,6 1536,6/64,2
village 480,2/9,9 352,6/73,4 276,8/78,5 75,6/21,4
Lugansk region
city / town 2190,8/86,0 1213,0/55,4 520,2/42,9 690,5/56,9
village 355,4/13,9 259,3/73,0 222,4/85,8 36,9/14,2
10 Based on the data: Державний комітет статистики, Всеукраїнський перепис насе-
лення 2001 г. Розподіл населення за національністю та мовою. Все населення, обидві статі. 
Донецька та Луганська області, http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua.
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We have intentionally divided this impact into two directions: in a city / town 
and in a village. Both regions are approximately equal. The share of the Ukrain-
ians is approximately the same here. From among these citizens only 35.6% of 
urban residents in Donetsk region recognized the Ukrainian language as the native 
one and 42.9% – in Lugansk region. In rural areas there were 78.5% and 85.8%, 
respectively. These fi gures can indicate a very low level of national identifi cation 
of the Ukrainians in Donbas. If we consider a language as an important factor of 
self-identifi cation of a nation, the situation is as follows. The Russian language was 
recognized as native by 64.2% of city / town dwellers of Ukrainian nationality in 
Donetsk region and 56.9% – in Lugansk region. The villagers – 21.4% and 14.2%, 
respectively. Remind, that it was the fi rst decade of Ukrainian independence, when 
the Law “On the Languages in the Ukrainian SSR” had already been adopted. Ar-
ticle 2 of that Law provided “a comprehensive development and functioning of the 
Ukrainian language in all the spheres of public life”.11
If we consider the national structure of Donbas and its language component 
in the focus of the hybrid war, it is impossible not to recognize that the estimations 
of its initiators were absolutely accurate. The region with a low national identity 
and populated by citizens who have close relationship with the citizens of the ag-
gressor country was more than a convenient object of invasion. It is doubtful that it 
was a great discovery for someone.
Referring to the authority of our colleagues-philologists, we should note, 
that they do not exclude the formation of language alliances: “If the languages have 
different origins, but a historical process sent the native speakers to the same cultur-
al and geographic area, sooner or later they form the so-called language union...”12
In our view these are the basic premises of invasion and creation of the qua-
si-states on the territory of Donetsk and Lugansk regions, arising from the peculi-
arities of their national structure. It is the national structure, similar in composition 
to the country-aggressor, and the same languages of communication have made 
Donbas susceptible to aggression more than any other region of the country. Out-
side of our attention were left the activities of the Ukrainian authorities directed at 
leveling of the above mentioned prerequisites. By the account they failed to prevent 
the aggression, it is rather diffi cult to call those activities a success. Moreover, ac-
cording to the data of sociologists (December, 2014) 23.3% of residents in Donetsk 
region supported the “DNR”.13Though it is the topic for the next article, it should 
be noted, that this fi gure is the refrain for the Ukrainian authorities.
11 Закон Української Радянської Соціалістичної республіки “Про мови в Українській 
РСР”. Вводиться в дію Постановою Верховної ради № 8313 від 28.10.1989 р., http://zakon.
rada.gov.ua/laws/show/8312-11.
12 Г. Старостин, Как создается единая классификация языков мира?, https://
culturelandshaft.wordpress.com/великий-и-могучий/как-создается- единая-классификация-я.
13 Такой разный Юго-Восток, opros2014.zn.ua.
